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Abstract
This study examines the signals of trust in stolen data advertisements by analysing the structural
and situational factors that influence the type of feedback sellers receive. Specifically, this article
explores the factors associated with positive and negative buyer feedback from the purchase of
stolen credit card data in a series of advertisements from a sample of Russian and English lan-
guage forums where individuals buy and sell personal information. The results of zero-inflated
Poisson regression models suggest that the sellers may influence their likelihood of receiving feed-
back by specifying the type of payment mechanism, choosing the advertisement language and se-
lecting the type of market they operate within. The implications of this study for our understanding
of online illicit markets, criminological theory and policy-making will be explored in depth.
Akerlof’s [1] idea that lemon markets are created by information
asymmetry has been widely accepted within economics, however lit-
tle is explored within criminology (exceptions include [41], and
[39], both in respect to drug markets). Information asymmetry refers
to buyers and sellers having different information about the quality
of a product, which creates a lemon market [1]. Buyers in lemon
markets are unable to differentiate between sellers offering quality
products and those offering poor quality products, or lemons.
Buyers are only willing to pay a price somewhere between that of
quality and lemon products, which forces quality sellers to either ac-
cept a reduced price for their products or to leave the market [1].
Buyers are also less inclined to participate in the market due to the
reduced quality of goods which may further reduce the quality of
products. Quality sellers are also less active in such markets because
they do not get the full price for their products.
The concept of information asymmetry has particular value for
criminological inquiry regarding illicit markets for goods and services
including drugs [25–28, 30, 49] and prostitution [17, 18]. Within
transactional markets, criminals have little opportunity for recompense
in the event they experience loss or are intentionally duped into buying
poor quality products or are dissatisfied with a service [27, 30, 47].
Individuals cannot contact police due to risk of arrest, and may instead
depend on vigilante justice in order to compensate financial losses
[27, 44]. As a consequence, some criminals may willingly exploit this
lack of social control in order to deceive participants for their own eco-
nomic advantage.
Researchers have expanded on information asymmetry through
the use of signalling theory as established in a wide variety of discip-
lines, from economics to biology [8, 43]. Gambetta’s [9] recent contri-
butions to both criminology and signalling theory expands our
understanding of the ways criminals identify themselves to each other
and signal trustworthiness in an otherwise untrusted environment.
Specifically, when there is information asymmetry, it is in a signaller’s
best interests to signal their trustworthiness regardless of whether they
are actually trustworthy. Untrustworthy actors attempt to mimic the
signals used by their trustworthy counterparts, making it in the re-
ceiver’s best interest to differentiate between those who are trust-
worthy and those that are not. Legitimate actors use signals that may
be too costly for untrustworthy actors to replicate, which provides a
potential way for receivers to interpret signals produced.
Within face-to-face transactions, such as drug markets or prosti-
tution, actors determine an individual’s legitimacy and reputation
based on verbal and non-verbal cues in order to engage in a success-
ful transaction of goods and services [17, 18, 25–30, 47, 49]. For in-
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stance, Jacobs [26, 28] found that drug dealers were extremely sus-
picious of unknown clients, and would look for cues that indicated
they might be law enforcement representatives, such as their style of
speech and physical posture. Hegghammer [10] examined the sig-
nals that terrorist recruiters used, finding that they preferred not to
recruit online and instead used visual and verbal signals, such as eth-
nicity, reactions to prayers and the reciting of poems.
These studies are invaluable to understand how actors in real-
world face-to-face illicit transactional markets are structured by in-
ternal and external risks. There is, however, minimal research on
the ways that risk avoidance techniques are employed and affect
the practices of offenders in discrete or low visibility, markets.
Few have considered how online markets for illicit products,
including drugs, [2] malicious software [15] and stolen financial
information [11, 24, 35] are shaped by actor’s perceptions of risk
and the signalling mechanisms provided. Robust transactional
markets have developed online, and researchers like Tzanetakis
and associates (2016) argue that online markets provide partici-
pants with a substantial amount of information that can be used
to minimize risk and harm (see also [3]). At the same time, the
faceless nature of the Internet makes it difficult for actors to rely
on signals of quality or identity in order to assess trust and reli-
ability. Text-based online mediums make it difficult for individuals
to interpret foreground or situational cues, as they can be easily
faked (e.g. [7, 11, 21]).
We use information asymmetry and Gambetta’s signalling theory
to demonstrate the ways that sellers in stolen data markets signal their
prospective trustworthy nature within the marketplace, and the ways
that buyers respond to those signals via feedback. In stolen data mar-
kets, dishonest traders who cheat buyers are referred to as ‘rippers’
[7]. Legitimate sellers of stolen data compete in the same market-
places, though they must differentiate themselves from rippers in
order to be successful. Dishonesty in data markets has tangible eco-
nomic costs, creating a prospective ‘tax’ on all purchases [11].
Essentially, genuine sellers of illegal goods will never be able to receive
the true value for their products, as they have to accept reduced pay-
ments as a cost of doing business in an environment where malicious
actors are present [11]. Data buyers must also discern the legitimacy
of a seller in order minimize their risk of loss [18, 22].
Understanding information asymmetry in stolen data markets is
essential to improve our knowledge of the signals that demonstrate a
seller is trustworthy, and identify the formal and informal factors that
encourage vendor success. Recognizing the practices of sellers and
their influence on buyer reviews can also increase our understanding
of the social relationships that affect individual’s position within the
market generally (see also [35]). In turn, the findings may enable us to
identify the factors that encourage market failure and reduce demand
by pushing quality sellers out of the market.
Thus, this study used Gambetta’s [8] signalling theory to identify
what signals are used by sellers to indicate trustworthiness within
their advertisements for stolen data on Russian and English lan-
guage web forums. A zero-inflated Poisson regression model was
conducted using positive feedback as the dependent variable to iden-
tify the unique advertiser and market-specific factors that were asso-
ciated with trust in a seller. Positive feedback was used as it most
closely corresponds to the notion of signalling theory in that positive
comments are associated with the trust in market actors. The find-
ings demonstrate that signals in online environments are of mixed
value and may not be easily interpreted by prospective clients. The
implications of this study for our understanding of information
asymmetry, signalling theory and public policy are discussed in
detail.
Stolen data market operations and signalling
theory
Over the last decade, there have been multiple incidents of massive
data breaches affecting retailers, payment processors, and govern-
ment entities by hackers across the globe [12, 37, 42]. Actors gain
internal access to sensitive data feeds and systems, and then acquire
millions of credit and debit card details, as well as sensitive person-
ally identifiable information. The sheer quantity of information that
can be acquired by a small group of hackers and data thieves is be-
yond the capacity of these groups to use efficiently or effectively
without being detected.
As a result, there is now a burgeoning market for individuals to
sell the information that they obtain through hacking and other
forms of data theft directly to others via web forums and Internet
Relay Chat channels, and a corresponding body of scholarship
studying this phenomenon [7, 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 35, 50,
51]. Though these markets are hosted in various countries around
the world, many of the most active appear to operate out of Russia
and Eastern Europe [15, 36, 45].
The text-based nature of these markets coupled with the range of
goods and services offered (e.g. [7, 18]) creates a substantial envir-
onment for information asymmetry that can negatively impact
buyers and sellers. It is unclear how legitimate sellers and buyers sig-
nal identity, intentions, and the quality of goods and services in a
way that cannot be easily mimicked by rippers. Rippers may be ac-
tive in stolen data markets as there is little consequence or cost to
them for defrauding buyers in this underground economy [7, 21, 22,
24]. The quality of data sold within stolen data markets is also sub-
ject to information asymmetry as rippers can cheat buyers by either
not delivering products or selling products of little or no quality.
Illegitimate vendors can profit from these exchanges, though their
buyers cannot.
The processes of the market also operate in a seller’s favour, as
they require prospective buyers to send payments first, and wait for
data or services to be provided, typically within a 24–48 h period [7,
11, 21, 35, 50]. The buyer cannot determine the quality of the data
purchased until they receive it, which in the case of rippers may ei-
ther be invalid, non-functional or completely absent due to non-de-
livery [11, 21, 22, 35, 50]. There are no formal dispute resolution
mechanisms that can be used by actors within the markets due to
the inherently illegal nature of these transactions and products sold,
creating opportunities for rippers to post false advertisements for
products [21, 22, 50].
To minimize the risk of harm, forums provide informal mechan-
isms that encourage trust between participants and sanction less rep-
utable actors [16, 21, 22, 50]. Many markets encourage buyers to
publicly post feedback on their experience with a vendor, both posi-
tive and negative, in order to establish the credibility of a seller and
promote trust between market actors generally [21, 22, 35, 50].
Since transactions occur outside of the forum, the ability to provide
positive comments about a seller and their services appear to in-
crease their potential share of the market, while those with negative
feedback (regarding rippers) may eventually be ostracized and
driven out of the community [16, 21, 35].
Characteristics of markets that may affect
feedback
Feedback is designed to be a signal by a buyer, which can be
received and interpreted by other buyers as an indication of the
trustworthiness of a seller. Genuine sellers can expect to be
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rewarded from the sale of quality products, with a positive reputa-
tion bringing in more frequent sales, and satisfied buyers resulting in
repeat customers. Once a buyer has made a successful payment and
profited from the purchase, they will trust the same seller in the next
transaction [32]. This experiential learning process of product qual-
ity creates the trust between the parties. If there is a compromise of
quality, negative feedback will go against the seller’s reputation and
affect the vendor. However, untrustworthy sellers who attempt to
mimic their reliable counterparts also operate in stolen data mar-
kets. Rippers may generate false accounts in order to generate fake
positive feedback, or leave negative feedback for their competitors
(e.g. [24]). Moderators are tasked with policing such matters, and in
some instances feedback cannot be left without first investing time
and interacting in the marketplace [24].
The overall availability of information about both buyers and
sellers in online markets has been referred to as ‘transparency para-
dox’ [48]. Researchers examining illicit drug cryptomarkets operat-
ing on the Tor network argue that the online nature of the
exchanges increases the need for measures to anonymize the partici-
pants’ location and real identity, while at the same time limiting the
risks for participants to purchase impure products or experience
physical violence [3, 48].
Though stolen data markets share some common elements with
cryptomarkets, including the lack of face-to-face interactions and
physical violence, there may be a greater risk of being defrauded or
the data an individual purchases are outdated and unusable [22].
This may be a function of the nature of the open web, as individuals
may be more readily able to access content hosted on forums and
websites that can be identified via search engines like Google.
Unscrupulous actors may be able to easily gain access to more public
markets and prey upon those who are unfamiliar with its processes
[11]. In fact, [6] show that outsiders can penetrate forums and post
false feedback that disrupts the flow of information and sow distrust
that essentially breaks down the relationship between market actors.
Thus, more transparent information does not result in better signal-
ling, as rippers may take advantage of this information availability
to defraud the buyers.
According to signalling theory, it is in the interest of genuine
sellers and buyers to produce signals that are relatively cheap to
emit, yet costly to mimic [8]. There is also an incentive for rip-
pers to mimic the signals used by legitimate sellers in order to
draw in customers. There are differences in the types of signals
that a ripper may be able to employ [9]. According to signalling
theory, weak signals are those that are inexpensive for rippers to
mimic. For example, simply stating that one is trustworthy comes
at no further cost to the seller. Persuading signals are those that
are relatively cheap to the genuine seller, but come at a cost to
the ripper [9]. For example, some forums have hierarchical struc-
tures where vendors achieve certain levels or statuses based on
the days of activity and number of public messages [6]. A legitim-
ate vendor will have to invest time in a forum to establish a repu-
tation (e.g. [35]) while a ripper would also need to invest time
and then risk losing his status because of ripping.
The competing signals of rippers and genuine sellers broadcasted
at the same time creates complexity for the recipients, who must de-
termine their accuracy. The balance between accurate signals and
the ability to interpret signals successfully creates three cost condi-
tions [8]. The first is the equilibrium condition, in which there is a
clear separation of genuine signallers who successfully signal their
legitimacy relative to untrustworthy actors. The second is the unin-
formative condition, in which the signals produced by both those
who can be trusted and those who cannot are unable to be
differentiated by recipients. The third condition is semi-sorting, an
intermediate condition, in which trustworthy actors signal their le-
gitimacy while others are able to mimic these signals. Recipients in
these instances are able to process some of these signals accurately
based on the quality of a signal, though not all signals can be suc-
cessfully interpreted [8]. The less informative the cost condition, the
greater the information asymmetry.
Limited research has examined the issue of signals of trust within
stolen data markets using samples from single forums [5, 6]. The
findings suggest that positive and negative evaluations, the number
of ads posted by a seller and the price for data influence the likeli-
hood that buyers and sellers could form relational ties. These studies
provide potential direction for research on trust within underground
markets for data, though they are based on single forum samples
which do not take into account the spectrum of markets in operation
across the larger universe of markets generally [22]. In addition,
they did not distinguish sellers from buyers, but examined all partici-
pants in a single marketplace. This is a key limitation as sellers and
buyers may send and receive different signals. Each transaction ori-
ginates with the advertisement of products, leading sellers to signal
to prospective buyers their trustworthiness via different clues in their
posts.
As a result, advertisements are the salient signal presented by
sellers that are interpreted by other market actors, and serve as the
basis for buyers to produce their own signals to the rest of the
marketplace as to the trustworthy nature of the vendor. The larger
body of research on stolen data markets provides insights regarding
the factors within an advertisement, the sellers’ practices, and the
forum that may serve as signals of trust for the rest of the market.
Specifically, the presence of negative feedback posted about a seller
may serve as a clear signal to others within the market that an indi-
vidual is not reliable. Buyers may opt to purchase from vendors with
fewer instances of negative feedback because they appear more reli-
able and minimize the potential for economic harm (e.g. [22]).
Negative feedback may be a signal that sellers are unable to directly
influence or mimic, making it a costlier signal that is dependent en-
tirely on the participation of genuine sellers.
The status of a seller may also have some association with their
overall level of trust. Many forums maintain a user-based naming
hierarchy to differentiate between new and established members
(e.g. [6, 13]). Users may progress to a higher level based on their
time spent in the forum, the number of posts and sales made, and
their general reputation within the site [6]. Forums also have ad-
ministrators or moderators who can participate and adjudicate the
disputes on a forum as well as warned or banned users for bad be-
haviour. Since rank may be an indication of an individual’s level of
trust, risk-averse buyers may seek out vendors who have been on a
forum for some time because they can identify the seller’s post his-
tory and determine their reputation [6, 35].
The length of time that an individual spends within a site and the
total number of posts they make are also pertinent signals of trust
[6, 35]. The more time an ad has been available for individuals
within the market to view, the more it serves as a marker for others
to evaluate the reputation of a user on the basis of publicly posted
feedback. Similarly, the number of posts a user makes on the forum
indicates their willingness to interact with other users and build trust
and a reputation. Such a signal is, however, time-consuming for a
ripper to falsify and may serve as a valuable data point affecting
trust between market actors [6].
The advertised price of a product is also an immediate point of
information about a vendor that could be interpreted by prospective
buyers. Such information allows buyers to potentially select a seller






/cybersecurity/article-abstract/2/2/137/2525525 by guest on 30 April 2020
on the basis of their pricing structure alone, due to the economic in-
centive to gain a large return on investment (e.g. [22]). Decary-Hetu
and Laferriere [6] found that users who indicated prices for products
in their ads had a lower probability of forming negotiating ties. At
the same time, the price for information may be readily falsified by a
vendor in order to attract unsuspecting buyers. The desire to pay
very little for data may be overwhelming for some (e.g. [11]) while
others may be willing to pay a higher price if it guarantees functional
products and a greater likelihood of profit [11, 20]. Thus, the price
of data may create more noise than signals within stolen data
markets.
The use of various payment methods used to exchange money
between the actors may also be a signal of trust. Many sellers accept
digital currencies of some type, and a small proportion also use real-
world payments through Money Gram or Western Union as these
are established services for the transfer of hard currency transnation-
ally [21, 35]. Funds transferred through Western Union are guaran-
teed, making it a more attractive payment mechanism in order to
obtain cash. The use of physical payment systems are, however,
more risky as individuals must arrive to a wire transfer location and
provide identification in order to obtain their currency (e.g. [21,
24]). These conditions may make Western Union a preferred pay-
ment mechanism for vendors, but a potential signal for buyers of the
inability to trust a seller.
The use of escrow payments may also be a signal used by sellers
to guarantee a successful transaction (see [16], Wehinger, 2012).
Escrow services are designed to limit buyers’ risks because this form
of payment operates through the use of an intermediary who holds
funds on behalf of a buyer (e.g. [21, 22]). The seller must provide
whatever products or services were negotiated in working order to
the buyer, who then allows the escrow agent to release the funds to
the seller. Typically, a forum selects a single individual to serve as an
escrow agent, which is a position of trust in the market. While ac-
cepting escrow payments should increase a vendor’s perceived trust,
they are not required to accept escrow payments by anyone within
the forum (e.g. [20]). Sellers could use falsely claim to use escrow,
but never actually follow through on that claim, making it an easy
signal to fake by untrustworthy actors.
The level of customer service advertised by sellers may be an-
other signal of trust and reliability. Some vendors promote their use
of dedicated customer support lines via ICQ and email to answer
questions posed by buyers, facilitate purchases and demonstrate
their willingness to satisfy customer needs (e.g. [7, 16, 21, 24]).
Research suggests that buyers are more likely to praise sellers that
maintain rapid and frequent contact with their customer base [16,
21], and thus the use of dedicated customer support services may be
a valuable signal of trust that may not be readily falsified by rippers.
In much the same way, sellers may have their products reviewed
by a moderator or tester in order to help validate their reputation.
Some forums provide product-testing services, whereby an individ-
ual designated by the forum obtains a sample of products from a
vendor in order to assure the quality of their goods [15, 21, 22, 24].
The tester posts a public review of their product or service to valid-
ate any claims the seller made. Some forums verify a seller’s reputa-
tion through this process, which buyers can observe as a signal of
trust and reliability [21, 22]. This practice appears to fit within sig-
nalling theory, as the seemingly wasteful action of providing a sam-
ple of data with monetary value at no cost for the purpose of
verification may actually be useful to the seller [8]. At the same
time, forums do not consistently have product testers available, or
do not mandate that a seller have their products formally reviewed.
Unscrupulous vendors may, therefore, claim they are willing to have
their products tested but know they will not be required to do so.
This may render product testing to be a signal that can be falsified
by vendors within this market.
The type of products sold within data markets may also broad-
cast their own signals regarding the trustworthy nature of a vendor.
The most prevalent product sold across most data markets are
dumps, or debit and credit card account numbers, followed by
CVVs which include a credit card number and the three-digit Credit
Verification Value on the back of the card (see [7, 20, 21, 51]).
Rippers may target inexperienced buyers by creating fictitious ad-
vertisements for these common products that appear competitively
priced compared to legitimate vendors in the market (see [11]).
Similarly, the language used by market actors may serve as a sig-
nal of trust. The predominant language used in forums may directly
impact the ability of individuals to participate, as those who are not
fluent may be unable to effectively communicate. Evidence suggests
that trustworthy sellers and reliable products are offered in markets
where actors communicate with one another in Russian (e.g. [20,
46]). There is also a relationship between the language used by mar-
ket actors and the advertised price of data [20]. This may stem from
the fact that Russian-speaking nations have difficult extradition re-
lationships with the USA and other European nations, thereby
decreasing the risk of detection and prosecution for offenders [4].
Vendors who are unable to communicate in the same language as
genuine sellers may be easily identified by others, making the lan-
guage of a market a difficult signal to mimic. Though individuals
may be able to partially mimic foreign language knowledge in
forums through the use of machine translation programmes, their in-
ability to appropriately use jargon and slang effectively will lead
them to stand out from native speakers [14]. Thus, the language
used in advertisements may serve as a costly signal of trust to differ-
entiate legitimate vendors from rippers.
Research design
Taken as a whole, there is evidence that advertisements in stolen data
markets produce signals which buyers must interpret in order to suc-
cessfully complete a transaction. The preponderance of information
about participants in online forums makes it possible to know a great
deal about an actor [48]. At the same time, there is a negative selection
problem as untrustworthy actors are able to cheat customers by mim-
icking signals produced by genuine sellers and drive legitimate vendors
from the market. Buyers should have an inclination to discount all ad-
vertisements since they have limited recourse to enforce the terms of
any transaction on their end [11, 21, 22, 24].
In order to identify the signals that may have the greatest value
in interpreting a seller’s reputation, this study uses a sample of
Russian and English-language forums to examine the relationship
between positive feedback (signals by buyers indicating the worth of
advertisements) and signals used within advertisements, as well as
the practices of the vendor, and the larger language preferences of
the markets., characteristics and activity of vendors, price devi-
ations, the purchase method, the provision of customer support and
product testing, types of products sold and the language used.
We test the following model to account for signalling mechan-
isms within stolen data markets:
Si= f(neg, user_title, date, posts, price deviation, payment, serv-
ice, product,language)
In this study, we use feedback comments as a signal left by buyers
to indicate the worth of a product/transaction outcome. We
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hypothesise that positive feedback comments (f) are a function of
the presence of negative feedback, user titles (new, regular and se-
nior), price deviations on the forum, the payment method (e.g.
Western Union), customer service, product type (dumps) and the of-
ficial language used by forum participants. We focus on advertise-
ments for dumps and CVV data as they are the most frequently sold
products in our sample.
Data
To examine the role of signalling in stolen data markets, we use
posted advertisements and their corresponding feedback from a
sample of six web forums where criminals and hackers buy, sell, and
trade stolen financial and personal information. These forums act as
online discussion groups where individuals can post advertisements,
as well as present issues or discuss problems, and serve as important
sources of data for researchers [19]. Each forum is composed of
threads, which are a series of posts that centre on a specific topic
under a forum’s general heading. Threads begin when a registered
user creates a post within a forum, asking a question or making a
statement, and others respond with posts of their own. The content
of threads provides information on the practices of market actors
[21, 33, 35].
The initial sample of 13 forums was developed via a snowball
sampling procedure (see [13, 14, 21]). Three English language
forums were identified through Google.com using common terms in
stolen data markets, including ‘carding dump purchase sale CVV’
[21, 35]. One of these sites was a sub-forum of a larger Russian lan-
guage forum. After exploring the content of threads from these sites,
three Russian language forums were identified via web links pro-
vided by forum users. Six additional forums were identified using
the same processes to create a total of 10 Russian language sites and
3 English language forums. Of the 13 forums that were identified, 6
were used for this analysis (2 Russian and 4 English language). The
criterion for inclusion was that they contained at least five advertise-
ments for dumps and CVV data.
Of the six forums sampled, four were publicly accessible, in that
the entire site could be accessed by anyone in the general public. The
two remaining sites required that an individual create a registered
user account within the site in order to access the content of the sub-
forums related to data sales. Registration-restricted forums are
thought to differ from that of publicly accessible forums because
they add a layer of insularity and protection from outsiders and the
general public [14, 34]. Registration systems allow anyone to join
by registering a username and password account with the forum.
This is not as exclusive or secure as invitation only forums that com-
pletely exclude outsiders from access, though registration eliminates
the potential for threads to be captured by search engines or identi-
fied easily by general public [14, 34]. To capture the forum content
across all sites, usernames were created for each forum, but to re-
duce the potential for contamination there was no interaction with
other registered participants [14, 34].
All threads posted from carding or sales related sub-forums were
captured to develop a substantive volume of posts. A certified Russian
translator with substantive experience with technological jargon and
forum communications translated the Russian language content from
all forums. Due to the availability of the translator, convenience sam-
ples of 25 threads from each Russian forum were selected to capture
the most recently posted items for sale in each site. Additional samples
of threads were translated from five forums, particularly those that
had active posting, to better assess the practices of actors and the net-
work connectivity of participants. Repeat threads were excluded from
analysis, but translated to ensure reliability of content. The research
team also oversampled threads from the English language forums to
capture any variations in the nature of these markets and their organ-
izational composition. This strategy provided a mix of user popula-
tions and duration over time, while at the same time creating a
relatively matched sample of posts between English and Russian lan-
guage threads across the forums (see Table 1 for detail).
The unit of analysis of this study is the advertisements for two
specific products: (i) dumps, referring to debit or credit card account
numbers and personal information, and (ii) CVVs, which include a
credit or debit card account number plus the three-digit Credit
Verification Value on the signature line of the card used in order to
make purchases online or over the phone. These data types were the
most prominent in the sample, and had differing amounts of feed-
back. Dumps were the most common product advertised in this sam-
ple of threads (n¼5732; 55.15%), in keeping with research from
both IRC [7] and forum-based data markets [21]. CVV data was the
second most common product (n¼4481, 43.12%). Each advertise-
ment was coded using content analysis techniques (see [14, 20]) to
create quantitative variables relating to positive and negative feed-
back (the dependent variables), and the potential signals used within
advertisements (the independent variables).
Dependent variables
The dependent variable was the total number of posts featuring
positive buyer feedback. Any comments indicating that a buyer had
engaged in a transaction and were satisfied with the outcome
(including ‘good data’, ‘reasonable price’ and ‘data worked’) were
coded as positive feedback. Posts where the user indicated they at-
tempted to complete a transaction but either did not receive their
purchase (e.g. ‘guy is ripper’, ‘where is my data’), or the data were
non-functional, were coded as negative feedback.
Approximately 78% of all advertisements received no specific
feedback. These zeros may stem from two different processes driving
forum interactions (Table 2). First, some advertisements prompted
interested parties to ask questions of the seller in an attempt to clar-
ify, or strengthen, signals, but had no evidence of observable
transaction-based feedback. These exchanges may have led to
privately-completed transactions that did not produce observable
feedback (e.g. [35]). Secondly, some advertisements did not generate
any posts from forum participants, or true zeros due to the absence
of feedback. This may be because the advertisement was new, based
on a product with no market interest, or was clearly falsified. The
zero-inflated regression models allow us to account for these proc-
esses by separately estimating the probability of a post receiving
zero feedback (logit portion of the model), and the actual regression
model that predicts what factors will lead to higher number of posi-
tive feedback posts.
Independent variables
Multiple social and market-related variables were coded from the
language of each advertisement to consider how they serve as signals
Table 1. Forum data summary statistics
Number of forums 6
Number of threads per forum 6-590
Total number of threads 1889
Total number of posts 9117
Russian language only forums 2
English language only forums 4
Time frame 5/9/2007-2/25/2012
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of trust for the seller. Since advertisements may generate both posi-
tive and negative feedback, we coded for the presence of ‘negative
feedback’ in the same posts that received positive feedback. Posts
where the user indicated they attempted to complete a transaction
but either did not receive their purchase (e.g. ‘guy is ripper’, ‘where
is my data’), or the data were non-functional, were coded as nega-
tive feedback and used as a continuous variable in this model.
To assess the relationship between a forum assigned participa-
tion ranking and reputation, three binary variables were created to
contain the most common ranks assigned across the forums in this
sample. Since the titles used varied by forum, these categories repre-
sent users on the basis of their general classification. ‘Senior mem-
bers’ were individuals whose user titles containing senior, VIP,
experienced or other indications of the highest rank in their title.
‘Regular members’ were coded on the basis of a lack of superlatives
in their title, including: vendors, users and members (across 10
forums). ‘New members’ were coded on the basis of terms such as
noob, new, fresh or any other indicator of a lowest level of a hier-
archy. Due to the missing data on some variables (e.g. administra-
tors not participating in posts with any positive feedback), we were
able to control only for these three categories. The comparative cat-
egory in this case becomes users without specific titles, unverified,
banned and guest members.
A variable was created to examine the relationship between the
duration of an ad and its role as a signal of trust. We calculated the
length of time an advertisement may have been observed by partici-
pants on the basis of the number of days the post was available on
the forum from the first date of posts observed in the sample of
threads obtained (number of days). An additional variable, ‘number
of posts’, was calculated to measure the total number of posts a user
made throughout the life of the forum during our observation period
as a control variable for user activity.
To examine the relationship between price and signals of trust,
the variable ‘price deviation’ was measured by calculating the z-
scores for the extent to which an advertised price deviated from the
forum’s mean price. Though users may not explicitly calculate the
extent to which an advertised price differs from the average within a
given market, they may associate a product’s price to the other pri-
ces they have seen in general (see [16, 21]). The mean price z-score is
around zero, indicating that indeed, the majority of users have cited
prices for dumps/CVV products very close to the forum’s mean.
None of the users advertised prices that were lower than one
standard deviation below a forum’s mean across all forums in our
data, while some have cited higher prices. This may be an indication
of price pegging with the need for further negotiations that took
place outside of the forum (e.g. [21]).
Two binary measures (0¼no; 1¼ yes) were created to assess the
potential influence of two payment mechanisms that may affect
seller reputations: (i) ‘Western Union’ and (ii) ‘Escrow’ payments.
Our comparative category is not indicating a specified payment
method in the advertisement. Western Union payments were
included due to the potential risk they present for buyers due to the
need to physically transfer funds to the seller. Escrow payments
were included because they are thought to provide a degree of trust
between participants, and may also be an easily falsified signal by
unscrupulous vendors.
Two binary measures (0¼no; 1¼ yes) for customer service were
also included to understand any influence they may have on the
positive comments. First, ‘customer support’ was measured based
on whether sellers indicated that they operated specialized customer
support lines through ICQ or email to aid customers in case of ques-
tions or issues, or provided assistance for buyers after a purchase in
order to facilitate the use of purchased data. The second measure,
‘product tested’, was based on indicators that forum moderators
had verified the seller, or tested their products. Additionally, a
dummy variable (0¼no; 1¼ yes) was created for ‘dumps’ to control
for their large presence in all ads and its relationship to any feedback
provided. The ‘primary language’ used in advertisements was coded
as a binary measure (0–Eng; 1–Rus).
Methods
To assess the factors affecting signalling of trust among buyers, we
ran a model for positive feedback using a zero-inflated Poisson regres-
sion. The zero-inflated models simultaneously estimate the logit
model to differentiate two mechanisms that may explain the abun-
dance of zeros in the data, along with a Poisson model, to identify fac-
tors affecting the actual count of positive feedback received. This
statistical test enabled comparisons between advertisement signals
that entice buyers and lead to feedback and those which do not.
Additionally, the count model allows for the identification of signals
leading to greater instances of positive feedback. The use of a Poisson
regression model also eliminates the need for statistical transform-
ation of skewed variables that would otherwise be required through
OLS and other regression techniques. Due to the clustered nature of
the data within forums, there is some possibility that effects exist due
to the non-independence of sellers within, but not necessarily across
forums. These issues can result in biases that produce errors in larger
statistical models. A common technique to control for such effects is
through the use of hierarchical logistical modelling (HLM), though at
least 10 units are preferred as the basis to conduct such an analysis.
Since there were only six forums that fit the criteria included in the
final sample, the models were conducted in Stata software using a
Taylor series to account for the sample design and provide accurate
testing of the coefficients and standard errors [31, 38].
Findings
The zero-inflated Poisson regression results for positive feedback are
shown in Table 3. Overall, the model is significant at 0.001 level,
and the Vuong test for zero-inflated model is significant indicating
the need for the selected model. The first column shows zero-
inflated Poisson regression coefficients, followed by standard errors
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, total number of observations is 9418




Positive comments 0.580 2.662 0 32
Negative comments 0.328 1.202 0 15
Senior members 0.034 0.180 0 1
Regular members 0.311 0.463 0 1
New members 0.524 0.499 0 1
Number of days 359.236 277.365 0 688
Number of posts 4.971 11.609 1 68
Price deviation 0.038 0.671 0.557 13.981
Western Union 0.253 0.435 0 1
Escrow 0.037 0.188 0 1
Customer support 0.080 0.271 0 1
Product tested 0.025 0.157 0 1
Dumps 0.542 0.498 0 1
Russian 0.023 0.150 0 1






/cybersecurity/article-abstract/2/2/137/2525525 by guest on 30 April 2020
and incidence rate ratios. The Poisson regression models the log of
expected count as a function of predictor variables, making the in-
terpretation of coefficients difficult. The Incidence Rate Ratios
(IRR) make the interpretation of the Poisson regression coefficients
easier.
The results suggest that sellers with negative feedback were more
likely to receive positive feedback. The IRR is 1.266, indicating that
users with negative feedback in the same posts are 26.6% more
likely to receive positive feedback as well. This is a complex finding,
as a legitimate vendor may generate both positive and negative feed-
back if their customer base reaches a certain size. At the same time,
this may reflect a trend of rippers posting positive comments in an
attempt to obscure signalling from negative feedback.
Vendors with a regular rank assigned by the forum were 21 times
more likely to receive positive feedback than other forum partici-
pants. The only other variable that provides such high odds is lan-
guage which also increases the odds of more positive comments by
nearly 17 times. Both of these variables are dichotomous, requiring
these high incidence rates to be viewed with caution. At the same
time, it may be an indication of a qualitative jump in the ability of
vendors with somewhat regular participation in a forum and com-
municating in Russian language markets to be more trustworthy
overall (see [6, 11, 20, 50]).
The date of posts was also significant, indicating that more recent
posts accumulated less positive feedback than older posts. Similarly,
users with a larger number of posts were more likely to receive positive
feedback. Such signals are extremely difficult for rippers to falsify and
provides a clear marker for identifying trustworthy vendors. This also
supports prior research that time spent on forums increases individual
network connectivity within the market [6, 35].
Additionally, the more a product’s price deviated above the
forum’s mean price, the less positive feedback that vendor will re-
ceive. Though some argue that the lower a product is priced, the less
likely that product is functional (e.g. [11]) there has been little re-
search assessing the ceiling for pricing. Advertising data at extremely
high prices can be an easily falsified signal by vendors, thus using a
more reasonable price point may make that vendor seem more in
touch with the market’s price tolerances. In fact, this finding pro-
vides partial support for the assertion that markets have a general in-
formally accepted price range for a product [16].
Interestingly, vendors who accepted Western Union in their ads
were less likely to receive positive feedback (change of factor 0.069 or
decrease of about 93%). It is not clear if this is a direct function of the
risk buyers face from using this payment type, leading to a need for
greater research on this issue. Escrow payments were also non-
significant, which may be a reflection of the optional nature of this pay-
ment mechanism across the market for data (e.g. [21, 22]). Finally,
vendors whose ads included customer service lines and support were
more than 2.4 times likely to receive positive feedback, reinforcing the
prominence that service plays within data markets (e.g. [20, 21]).
The results of the binary equation estimating the likelihood of
not receiving any feedback (feedback¼ zero group) are not pre-
sented here as this model did not perform as well our regression por-
tion. The only significant variable was the use of escrow services,
suggesting that the larger range of advertisement-specific and struc-
tural factors within the market are unable to differentiate between
signals and noise. As a result, there may be too much information
available in the text of advertisements for receivers to readily inter-
pret signals provided by vendors in data markets. This notion
contradicts some arguments related to the value of transparency in
online markets [3, 48] suggesting additional research is required to
better understand this issue.
Discussion and conclusion
This study attempted to understand the factors associated with sig-
nals of trust observed in advertisements by vendors within stolen
data markets by examining the positive feedback posted by individ-
uals who purchased products from vendors. Using Gambetta’s sig-
nalling theory [8, 9] with a sample of posts from active stolen data
forums, the results suggest that there are some clear signals in adver-
tisements that demonstrated seller trust. Examining the count
Table 3. Survey zero-inflated Poisson regression estimation results for of positive comments
Variables: Number of positive comments
B St. error e^B
Model 1: count equation: factor change in expected count for those not always 0
Negative comments 0.237** 0.037 1.267
Senior members 1.630 0.868 5.106
Regular members 3.069* 0.977 21.519
New members 0.685 0.823 1.985
Number of days 0.004* 0.002 0.996
Number of posts 0.037** 0.007 1.038
Price deviation 0.539 0.326 0.583
Western Union 2.664** 0.532 0.070
Escrow 0.748 0.412 0.473
Customer support 0.880* 0.356 2.411
Product tested 1.067 0.938 2.906
Dumps 1.053 0.626 0.349
Russian 2.886** 0.825 17.919





Note: *significant at P< 0.05 level; **significant at P< 0.001 level, ^P¼ 0.053. McFadden’s Adjusted R2 is 0.501, but this number can only be calculated for
zero-inflated model not adjusted for survey data, hence should be interpreted with caution.
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models for feedback conducted through zero-inflated Poisson regres-
sions indicated that sellers who also received negative feedback
received more positive feedback (see [6]). It may be an indication
that the quality of the feedback is an important factor on the mar-
ket, leading participants to seek additional information in order to
counteract negative comments received. This may also be a symp-
tom of false feedback posted by rippers in an attempt to shore up
their reputation and obfuscate their actual practices. Thus, future re-
search is needed to clarify the proportion of all sellers who receive
negative feedback to identify a baseline of customer complaints
across stolen data markets.
Signals such as user status indicate the importance of long-term
participation in a market in order to identify their potential level of
trust. Regular users were more likely to receive positive feedback
compared to the other ranks, demonstrating that achieving a certain
level within a forum is a more costly signal to mimic compared to
others. The linguistic structure of the forum was also a signal of
trust, as Russian language forums had fewer negative feedback re-
ported. It is unclear if this is a result of greater insularity and trust in
vendors within Russian language markets, or an artefact of the sam-
ple of threads acquired for this analysis. Additional research is
needed using larger samples of data from forums communicating in
multiple languages to understand the relationship between language
and trust in cybercrime markets generally (see also [16, 22]).
Several significant variables in this model suggest that stolen data
markets comprise a semi-sorted signalling condition, as some signals
can be readily interpreted while others are difficult to discern by re-
ceivers [8]. For instance, the use of customer service contact points
was significant, but any individual could establish an email or ICQ ac-
count at no cost and then post it in the language of an advertisement.
Similarly, vendors who accepted Western Union payments were less
likely to receive positive feedback. Since this language can be inserted
into any advertisement, the quantity and transparency of information
posted by vendors does not translate into better or more clear signals.
Since stolen data markets operate on the open web, it is possible
that they may differ from markets on the dark web and in the real
world in that they may provide more opportunities for risk of eco-
nomic harm. In drug markets (e.g. [26, 28]) and open-air sex markets
[18], actors can observe the foreground and situational cues of sellers
and prospective clients and use this information to structure their be-
haviour accordingly. The faceless nature of online spaces increases the
value of correctly interpreting advertising-based signals of risk, and
discerning trustworthy sellers (e.g. [7, 21, 22]). Though similar issues
are present in dark web drug markets, there appears to be less risk of
economic harm from vendors seeking to cheat buyers [3, 48]. Thus,
the findings of this study suggest that there are only a few factors that
serve as strong signals of trust that cannot be manipulated by vendors,
such as language and the total number of posts made.
Recognizing the pertinent signals of trust within stolen data markets
provides potential applications for market disruption. The findings of
this analysis suggest that the conditions within stolen data markets may
be manipulated and destabilized through the introduction of informa-
tion asymmetry. It may be possible to complicate the process of inter-
preting signals by flooding the market with multiple false posts for
products, as well as feedback for sellers. This technique, referred to as a
Sybil attack, may be effective in creating too many false signals and
increasing the difficulty in determining who is a reliable vendor [6, 7].
In addition to message quantity, the content of each message
may also be altered to hinder the ability of individuals to interpret
signals within the market. For example, this analysis found sellers
who indicated they accepted payments via Western Union was asso-
ciated with less satisfied customers. By altering the content of Sybil
messaging to correspond with law enforcement interventions, they
may create further uncertainty among market participants. In turn,
Sybil attacks may enable the efficient disruption of markets without
the need for arrests or prosecution of offenders. However, future re-
search will need to look at how this signalling mechanism affects fu-
ture market transactions.
At the same time, the use of Sybil attacks may only be effective
against poorly organized forums or for a short period of time in all
forums generally [7, 20]. Markets with moderators and managers that
directly interact with participants may delete posts at their discretion
(e.g. [22, 24]). Better organized forums may be able to discern false
posts more efficiently and subvert intervention attempts through Sybil
campaigns. In addition, a campaign of this sort is relatively public in
nature and may draw attention to the attempt by law enforcement
which may lead market actors to harden themselves against external
involvement. Thus, there is a need for law enforcement interventions
that combine various traditional and novel disruption approaches in
order to better affect the market for stolen data.
Though this study explored an under-examined form of crime,
there are several limitations that must be addressed. First, the data for
this study were drawn primarily from sites operating on the open web
with limited restrictions in order to access posts. The findings may not
be applicable to more hidden groups, which comprise a deeper por-
tion of the underground economy for stolen data. This includes sites
that require participants to be vetted by existing members and pay for
access to the forums (e.g. [22]). Additionally, there are a number of
markets operating as hidden services, which can only be accessed
through anonymity networks, such as Tor [2]. Sampling these forums
is complicated by the fact that few search engines, even operating
through Tor, index their content. Expanding the sample to include
more hidden markets can improve our knowledge of the relationships
between advertising signals and feedback. In turn, we may better iden-
tify the association between the structure of a forum and the levels of
trust between participants.
Second, it is possible that law enforcement or computer security
researchers may have generated posts within the forums. There is no
way to determine which posts were made by actual vendors and
buyers, and those made by individuals posing as criminals in order
to blend into, and potentially disrupt, the community. Future re-
search is needed which directly connects researchers with practi-
tioners to better understand and evaluate disruption activities and
separate market actor identities from those used by undercover op-
eratives. In turn, this may improve the validity of the models used to
identify signals within the market, and the ways that receivers cor-
rectly interpret this information.
Finally, this study did not examine signals such as the moniker
used by sellers [32], the length of time they had been in a forum or
how they interact with each other as prospective signals of trust [5].
Instead, we focused on the language used in advertisements for sto-
len data to identify how sellers signal their trust and worth. It is pos-
sible that monikers used by sellers may be easily mimicked, such as
using a similar name, or even taken over through an account hijack-
ing, in order to affect the signals made within the market. Thus, fur-
ther research is needed in order to consider how other signals may
directly affect trust within the market for stolen data. In turn, we
may better understand how data markets are structured, as well as
their relationship to other illicit markets online and offline.
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